Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European–Japanese differences in trust and cooperation
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2018, Vol 13, Issue 1
Abstract
Theories of trust distinguish general trust in situations of social uncertainty from assurance-based trust in committed, long-term relationships. This study investigates European-Japanese differences using the Centipede game, in which two players choose between cooperation and defection. The game models repeated reciprocal interactions, necessitating assurance-based trust to sustain cooperation. We included game conditions offering players the option of purchasing commitment-enhancing tools to increase social certainty. Japanese participants were more cooperative than Europeans, confirming higher assurance-based trust, and also purchased more commitment-enhancing tools, demonstrating their preferences for social certainty. Purchase of commitment-enhancing tools improved cooperativeness in both groups. However, if co-players refused tool purchase, the Japanese appeared to interpret this as non-cooperative intent and cooperativeness in the respective games decreased.
Authors and Affiliations
Eva M. Krockow, Masanori Takezawa, Briony D. Pulford, Andrew M. Colman, Samuel Smithers, Toshimasa Kita and Yo Nakawake
Keywords
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