Memory reflected in our decisions: Higher working memory capacity predicts greater bias in risky choice
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2010, Vol 5, Issue 2
Abstract
The current study looks at the role working memory plays in risky-choice framing. Eighty-six participants took the Automatic OSPAN, a measurement of working memory; this was followed by a risky-choice framing task. Participants with high working memory capacities demonstrated well pronounced framing effects, while those with low working memory capacities did not. This pattern suggests that, in a typical risky-choice decision task, elaborative encoding of task information by those with high working memory capacity may lead them to a more biased decision compared to those with low working memory.
Authors and Affiliations
Jonathan Corbin, Todd McElroy and Cassie Black
Keywords
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