Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2016, Vol 11, Issue 5
Abstract
We demonstrate that the desirability bias, the elevation of the estimated likelihood of a preferred event, can be due in part to the desire for consistency between the preference for the favored event and its predicted likelihood. An experiment uses a participant’s favorite team in Major League Baseball games and a recently devised method for priming the consistency goal. When preference is the first response, priming cognitive consistency moves prediction toward greater agreement with that preference, thereby increasing the desirability bias. In contrast, when prediction is the first response, priming cognitive consistency facilitates greater agreement with the factual information for each game. This increases the accuracy of the prediction and reduces the desirability bias.
Authors and Affiliations
J. Edward Russo and Jonathan C. Corbin
Keywords
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