Operational control over non-state proxies

Journal Title: Security and Defence Quarterly - Year 2020, Vol 31, Issue 4

Abstract

The intention of this paper is to clarify how state patrons control non-state proxy forces fighting on their behalf. In order to address the subject matter thoroughly, specific attention was paid to a number of questions including a) the criteria determining patronproxy relations, b) factors influencing the selection process of proxy forces, and c) principles governing the maximisation of potential benefits of using proxies, whilst simultaneously reducing risks and associated costs. The author applied a neo-realistic research paradigm to his work. Patron-proxy relations were presented in the context of the principal-agent theory, as well as through detailed analysis of ongoing scenarios involving Iran and Hezbollah, Russia and the Donbass separatists, Pakistan and Kashmiri militias, the US and Syrian rebels. The essence of war by proxy is to influence the strategic result of an armed conflict without direct, full-scale, military intervention. The use of non-state proxy, external actors is aimed at maximising their political goals and strategic interests whilst maintaining “plausible deniability”. By supporting non-state proxies, indirectly or by providing limited direct assistance, sponsors operate below the threshold of war. Empirical analysis of proxy war cases proves that such models may both guarantee “strategic victory” or become a “double-edged sword”. One of the key challenges for external powers engaged in war by proxy is to avoid unintended consequences (blowback). The author argues that elements such as ideology, ethnicity or religion do not necessarily ensure control over proxies, whilst the range of common goals and interests, and the level of the proxy’s dependency, are crucial.

Authors and Affiliations

Filip Bryjka

Keywords

Related Articles

Systemic Operational Design – a study in failed concept

One of the many reasons for the failure of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) in the Second Lebanon War was the concept of Systemic Operational Design (SOD), translated into de facto military doctrine. The story of the ris...

The role played by the armed forces for protection of the civilian population as part of humanitarian crises management. The Romanian approach

The actions of the military structures to protect the civilian population have evolved from air defence operations to complex missions of “human security”, based on prevention and intervention in any civil emergency situ...

Influence of global security environment on collective security and defence science

Globalisation is a phenomenon which influences every aspect of contemporary life. Neo- liberal ideas lead to the multifunctional interdependence of geopolitics, the political economy, international relations, security, a...

Ecological threats to security and state resilience in Afghanistan

This work explores ecological and climate-related threats to Afghanistan and discusses support approaches from a European Crisis Management (ECM) perspective. It goes beyond the much-debated troop withdrawal, COVID-19 cr...

E-learning in the Slovenian Armed Forces - From its first steps to its wider use

E-learning (EL) as part of the information society has, both within the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia (MoD), been facilitating the acquisition of knowledge through t...

Download PDF file
  • EP ID EP705835
  • DOI https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/131044
  • Views 81
  • Downloads 0

How To Cite

Filip Bryjka (2020). Operational control over non-state proxies. Security and Defence Quarterly, 31(4), -. https://europub.co.uk/articles/-A-705835