Public policy for thee, but not for me: Varying the grammatical person of public policy justifications influences their support
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2014, Vol 9, Issue 5
Abstract
Past research has shown that people consistently believe that others are more easily manipulated by external influences than they themselves are—a phenomenon called the “third-person effect” (Davison, 1983). The present research investigates whether support for public policies aimed at changing behavior using incentives and other decision “nudges” is affected by this bias. Across two studies, we phrased justification for public policy initiatives using either the second- or third-person plural. In Study 1, we found that support for policies is higher when their justification points to people in general rather than the general “you”, and in Study 2 we found that this former phrasing also improves support compared to a no-justification control condition. Policy support is mediated by beliefs about the likelihood of success of the policies (as opposed to beliefs about the policies’ unintended consequences), and, in the second-person condition, is inversely related to a sense of personal agency. These effects suggest that the third-person effect holds true for nudge-type and incentive-based public policies, with implications for their popular support.
Authors and Affiliations
James F. M. Cornwell and David H. Krantz
Keywords
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