Risky choice in younger versus older adults: Affective context matters
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2013, Vol 8, Issue 2
Abstract
Earlier frameworks have indicated that older adults tend to experience decline in their deliberative decisional capacity, while their affective abilities tend to remain intact (Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Auman, 2007). The present study applied this framework to the study of risky decision-making across the lifespan. Two versions of the Columbia Card Task (CCT) were used to trigger either affective decision-making (i.e., the “warm” CCT) or deliberative decision-making (i.e., the “cold” CCT) in a sample of 158 individuals across the lifespan. Overall there were no age differences in risk seeking. However, there was a significant interaction between age and condition, such that older adults were relatively more risk seeking in the cold condition only. In terms of everyday decision-making, context matters and risk propensity may shift within older adults depending upon the context.
Authors and Affiliations
Yumi Huang, Stacey Wood, Dale Berger and Yaniv Hanoch
Keywords
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