Sampling Individually Fundamental Simplexes as Sets of Players’ Mixed Strategies in Finite Noncooperative Game for Applicable Approximate Nash Equilibrium Situations with Possible Concessions
Journal Title: Journal of Information and Organizational Sciences - Year 2016, Vol 40, Issue 1
Abstract
In finite noncooperative game, a method for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations is developed. The method is prior-based on sampling fundamental simplexes being the sets of players’ mixed strategies. Whereas the sampling is exercised, the sets of players’ mixed strategies are mapped into finite lattices. Sampling steps are envisaged dissimilar. Thus, each player within every dimension of its simplex selects and controls one’s sampling individually. For preventing approximation low quality, however, sampling steps are restricted. According to the restricted sampling steps, a player acting singly with minimal spacing over its lattice cannot change payoff of any player more than by some predetermined magnitude, being specific for each player. The finite lattice is explicitly built by the represented routine, where the player’s mixed strategies are calculated and arranged. The product of all the players’ finite lattices approximates the product of continuous fundamental simplexes. This re-defines the finite noncooperative game in its finite mixed extension on the finite lattices’ product. In such a finite-mixed-extension-defined game, the set of Nash equilibrium situations may be empty. Therefore, approximate Nash equilibrium situations are defined by the introduced possible payoff concessions. A routine for finding approximate equilibrium situations is represented. Approximate strong Nash equilibria with possible concessions are defined, and a routine for finding them is represented as well. Acceleration of finding approximate equilibria is argued also. Finally, the developed method is discussed to be a basis in stating a universal approach for the finite noncooperative game solution approximation implying unification of the game solvability, applicability, realizability, and adaptability.
Authors and Affiliations
Vadim Romanuke
Keywords
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- EP ID EP408263
- DOI 10.31341/jios.40.1.6
- Views 114
- Downloads 0
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