Set-theoretic mereology
Journal Title: Logic and Logical Philosophy - Year 2016, Vol 25, Issue 3
Abstract
We consider a set-theoretic version of mereology based on the inclusion relation ⊆ and analyze how well it might serve as a foundation of mathematics. After establishing the non-definability of ∈ from ⊆, we identify the natural axioms for ⊆-based mereology, which constitute a finitely axiomatizable, complete, decidable theory. Ultimately, for these reasons, we conclude that this form of set-theoretic mereology cannot by itself serve as a foundation of mathematics. Meanwhile, augmented forms of set-theoretic mereology, such as that obtained by adding the singleton operator, are foundationally robust.
Authors and Affiliations
Joel David Hamkins, Makoto Kikuchi
Keywords
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- EP ID EP202147
- DOI 10.12775/LLP.2016.007
- Views 52
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