“The August Incident” and the Destiny of the Yanan Faction

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“The August Incident” and the Destiny of the Yanan Faction

Journal Title: International Journal of Korean History - Year 2012, Vol 17, Issue 2

Abstract

The Korean independence movement in China is widely divided into the Guerrilla Faction active in northern China (Manchuria) and the Independence Alliance in mainland China. The Yanan Faction boasted the closest ties to the Chinese Communist Party and was from an organizational standpoint linked to the Korean Independence Alliance and Korean Volunteer Army. The core members of the Yanan Faction belonged to the original Korean Volunteer Army or to the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army; others were officers in the Eighth Route Army that served as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China. As clearly exposed by the internal struggle that erupted in 1943, the Yanan Faction, which bore the characteristics of a unified front, was never as unified as the Guerrilla Faction. Both the Guerrilla Faction led by Kim Il-sung (Kim Ilsŏng) and the Yanan Faction led by Kim Tubong and Mu Chŏng played important roles in post-liberation North Korea. Because the new regime in North Korea was established with the support of the Soviet Army, the leaders of the Yanan Faction, who had maintained a close relationship with Communist China, found themselves serving as a background force that helped to prop up the Kim Il-sung regime. This outcome was the direct result of the internal relationships that existed within the Soviet-led socialist camp during the early Cold War. The Yanan Faction and some members of the Soviet Faction were purged from the Workers’ Party for being critical of Kim Il-sung in August 1956. Some of the members of the Yanan Faction were exiled to China. On September 18 of that same year, Mao Zedong held discussions with a Soviet delegation led by Anastas Mikoyan, during which time the decision was made to dispatch a delegation to North Korea. Mao Zedong predicted the possibility that Kim Il-sung would see the dispatch of this delegation as internal interference, and even considered the withdrawal of support troops. During talks with a delegation of the North Korean Workers’ Party led by Ch΄oe Yonggŏn, Mao Zedong criticized the purges of Pak Ilwu and Pang Hosan, demanded that a dialogue be opened with comrades who had differing opinions, and called for the release of arrested comrades. He also notified the Korean side of the imminent dispatch of a Sino-Soviet delegation. China was at the forefront of Far East affairs within the socialist camp before and after the outbreak of the Korean War. As such, Mao Zedong adopted an active stance during the early stages of the ‘August Incident’ of 1956. Sino-North Korean relations were at the time determined not by the actions of the Soviet Union, but rather by China’s approach to the prevailing problems and the solutions it offered up. Although North Korea on the surface appeared during the meeting of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers’ Party to accept the demands that had been made by China and the Soviet Union during the people’s assembly held in September, it nevertheless refused to grant amnesty to the ringleaders of the "August Incident." Even the interference of a Sino-Soviet delegation could not return the situation to what it had been prior to the ‘August Incident.’ After October 1956, Kim Il-sung was able to overcome the crisis and even further strengthen his ‘anti-factional struggle’ designed to purge the Yanan and Soviet Factions. Mao Zedong, whose interference proved to be of little assistance, interpreted this situation as highlighting Kim Il-sung’s strong independent streak. For various reasons, China was unable to distance itself from Kim Il-sung. In this regard, it came to view the silencing of the exiled Yanan Faction members as the price to be paid for the continuation of Sino-North Korean relations. The fundamental cause of the downfall of the Yanan Faction was the power structure that prevailed within the socialist camp. It was the composition of the socialist camp that determined the Yanan Faction’s eventual purge and even destruction at the hands of the Kim Il-sung led Guerrilla Faction. China’s reluctance to actively interfere in North Korean affairs proved to be another reason for the Yanan Faction’s collapse. Mao Zedong and China needed the support of North Korea to emerge victorious in the campaign to assume leadership within the socialist camp, and as such was not willing to cause a worsening of the Sino-North Korean relationship because of what it perceived as unnecessary interference. The lack of unity caused by the failure to assume leadership and grasp military power in North Korea ultimately proved to be the main cause of the collapse of the Yanan Faction. With the downfall of the Yanan Faction, North Korea took a decisive step toward uniformity.

Authors and Affiliations

Guangxi Jin

Keywords

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