The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations

Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2013, Vol 8, Issue 2

Abstract

An insurance policy may not only affect the consequences for victims but also for perpetrators. In six experiments we find that people recommend milder punishments for perpetrators when the victim was insured, although people believe that a sentence should not depend on the victim’s insurance status. The robustness of this effect is demonstrated by showing that recommendations can even be more lenient for crimes that are in fact more serious but in which the victim was insured. Moreover, even when harm was possible but did not materialize, people still prefer to punish crimes less severely when the (potential) victim was insured. The final two experiments suggest that the effect is associated with a change in (1) compassion for the victim and (2) perceived severity of the transgression. Implications of this phenomenon are briefly discussed.

Authors and Affiliations

Philippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde, Gideon Keren and Marcel Zeelenberg

Keywords

Related Articles

Context effects in games: Local versus global sequential effects on choice in the prisoner's dilemma game

We report an experiment exploring sequential context effects on strategy choices in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. Rapoport and Chammah (1965) have shown that some PDs are cooperative and lead to high cooperation...

How comparing decision outcomes affects subsequent decisions: The carry-over of a comparative mind-set

In the current paper we investigate how feedback over decision outcomes may affect future decisions. In an experimental study we demonstrate that if people receive feedback over the outcomes they obtained (“factual outco...

Taking the sting out of choice: Diversification of investments

It is often the case that one can choose a mix of alternative options rather than have to select one option only. Such an opportunity to diversify may blunt the risk involved in all-or-none choice. Here we investigate re...

The default pull: An experimental demonstration of subtle default effects on preferences

The impact of default options on choice is a reliable, well-established behavioral finding. However, several different effects may lend to choosing defaults in an often indistinguishable manner, including loss aversion,...

The influence of the ratio bias phenomenon on the elicitation of health states utilities

This paper tests whether logically equivalent risk formats can lead to different health state utilities elicited by means of the traditional standard gamble (SG) method and a modified version of the method that we call "...

Download PDF file
  • EP ID EP678050
  • DOI -
  • Views 124
  • Downloads 0

How To Cite

Philippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde, Gideon Keren and Marcel Zeelenberg (2013). The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(2), -. https://europub.co.uk/articles/-A-678050