The Liar Paradox from the Wittgensteinian Perspective
Journal Title: Studia Semiotyczne - Year 2017, Vol 0, Issue 2
Abstract
Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.
Authors and Affiliations
Jakub Gomułka, Jan Wawrzyniak
Keywords
Related Articles
- EP ID EP320659
- DOI -
- Views 50
- Downloads 0
Ocena argumentów w kontekście nauczania krytycznego myślenia
One of the main goals of critical thinking courses should be to provide students with tools helpful in making right choices in their daily lives. During such courses, much attention is usually paid to teaching the studen...
The Scale Structure of Moral Adjectives
In this paper we discuss how and whether moral adjectives fit a well-known semantics for gradable adjectives. We first test whether moral adjectives are relative or absolute adjectives. The preliminary results suggest th...
‘Ought’, Agents and Ambiguity that Matters
According to a well-homed view in linguistic semantics, deontic logic and logic of agency, some ‘ought’ sentences, like ‘Kate ought to write the report’, are ambiguous between the socalled agentive sense as when Kate is...
Co czyni zdanie prawdziwym?
W artykule rozważane jest zagadnienie związku między własnościami jednostkowymi i abstrakcyjnymi w kontekście problematyki uprawdziwiania (truthmaking). Proponowane jest pewne aksjomatyczne uogólnienie pojęcia konkretyza...
Directival Theory of Meaning Resurrected
The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival T...