The limited value of precise tests of the recognition heuristic

Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2011, Vol 6, Issue 5

Abstract

The recognition heuristic models the adaptive use and dominant role of recognition knowledge in judgment under uncertainty. Of the several predictions that the heuristic makes, empirical tests have predominantly focused on the proposed noncompensatory processing of recognition. Some authors have emphasized that the heuristic needs to be scrutinized based on precise tests of the exclusive use of recognition. Although precise tests have clear merits, I critically evaluate the value of such tests as they are currently employed. First, I argue that using precise measures of the exclusive use of recognition has to go beyond showing that the recognition heuristic—like every model—cannot capture reality completely. Second, I illustrate how precise tests based on response times can lead to unsubstantiated conclusions if the fact that the recognition heuristic does not model the recognition judgment itself is ignored. Finally, I highlight two key but so far neglected aspects of the recognition heuristic: (a) the connection between recognition memory and the recognition heuristic; and (b) the mechanisms underlying the adaptive use of recognition.

Authors and Affiliations

Thorsten Pachur

Keywords

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  • EP ID EP677829
  • DOI -
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How To Cite

Thorsten Pachur (2011). The limited value of precise tests of the recognition heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(5), -. https://europub.co.uk/articles/-A-677829