Trivial Dialetheism and the Logic of Paradox
Journal Title: Logic and Logical Philosophy - Year 2016, Vol 25, Issue 1
Abstract
In this paper we explain that the paraconsistent logic LP (Logic of Paradox) promoted by Graham Priest can only be supported by trivial dialetheists, i.e., those who believe that all sentences are dialetheias.
Authors and Affiliations
Jean-Yves Beziau
Keywords
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- EP ID EP201712
- DOI 10.12775/LLP.2015.022
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