Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia: A Computable General Equilibrium Model
Journal Title: Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics - Year 2010, Vol 3, Issue 5
Abstract
Russia has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption but has not successfully enforced it. This paper uses updated GTAP data to reconstruct a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to quantify the macroeconomic effects of corruption in Russia. Corruption is found to cost the Russian economy billions of dollars a year. A conclusion of the paper is that implementing and enforcing the UNCAC would be of significant economic benefit to Russia and its people.
Authors and Affiliations
Michael BARRY
Keywords
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