An interpretation of focal point responses as non-additive beliefs
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2014, Vol 9, Issue 4
Abstract
This paper provides a novel interpretation of focal point responses (0, 50, 100 percent) in terms of ambiguous beliefs dynamics that arise in new developments of decision theory such as Choquet expected utility theory. In particular, focal point responses that have been updated from nonfocal responses can be interpreted as non-additive beliefs that account for psychological bias. A focal point response of 100 that has been updated from a nonfocal response can be represented by a non-additive belief that has been updated according to the Overestimating Update Rule. A focal point response of zero that has been updated from a nonfocal response can be represented by a non-additive belief that has been updated according to the Underestimating Update Rule. Focal point responses given consistently over time are not subject to psychological bias, and can be represented by additive probability distributions. Estimation results show such a model to be a very good fit to the data.
Authors and Affiliations
Aylit Tina Romm
Keywords
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