Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2018, Vol 13, Issue 3
Abstract
Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.
Authors and Affiliations
Will M. Gervais, Michiel van Elk, Dimitris Xygalatas, Ryan T. McKay, Mark Aveyard, Emma E. Buchtel, Ilan Dar-Nimrod, Eva Kundtová Klocová, Jonathan E. Ramsay, Tapani Riekki, Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen and Joseph Bulbulia
Keywords
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