Berkeley, Newton, Explanation, and Causation

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Berkeley, Newton, Explanation, and Causation

Journal Title: Ruch Filozoficzny - Year 2018, Vol 74, Issue 4

Abstract

Berkeley notably compares his view of scientific (natural law) explanation—particularly in mechanics, astronomy, and optics—to Newton’s. The difficulty is that while for Newton basic laws, of astronomy for example, implicitly refer to efficient causes (henceforth “causes”) Berkeley allows causes only in metaphysics, more specifically causality through will or volition. Both men do think of explanation in terms of deducing particular generalizations from those more general; the deductive-nomological model of explanation (DN). Meeting its constraints, however, is not sufficient for an example of the DN form to be an explanation. I explore whether this is a problem for Berkeley, looking at two contemporary proposals for non-causal explanations, concluding neither is workable. It remains unresolved, then, whether Berkeley’s use of the DN model should, as he wishes, count as explanatory. The main text is De Motu

Authors and Affiliations

Richard Brook

Keywords

EP ID EP493514
DOI 10.12775/RF.2018.034
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