Composition as identity and plural Cantor's theorem
Journal Title: Logic and Logical Philosophy - Year 2016, Vol 25, Issue 3
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the thesis of Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor’s Theorem, and that this in turn has implications for our use of Cantor’s theorem in metaphysics. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano, and might be turned around to become an abductive argument for Composition as Identity
Authors and Affiliations
Einar Duenger
Keywords
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- EP ID EP202178
- DOI 10.12775/LLP.2016.009
- Views 85
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