Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems

Journal Title: Operations Research and Decisions - Year 2016, Vol 26, Issue 2

Abstract

An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.

Authors and Affiliations

Francesc CARRERAS, Josep FREIXAS, Antonio MAGAÑA

Keywords

Related Articles

Multi-objective geometric programming problem under uncertainty

Multiobjective geometric programming (MOGP) is a powerful optimization technique widely used for solving a variety of nonlinear optimization problems and engineering problems. Generally, the parameters of a multiobjectiv...

Innovation management in Polish enterprises

The modern enterprise operates in a turbulent, demanding and unstable environment. Technical and technological progress as well as socioeconomic development create new opportunities but, at the same time, they force ente...

Further open problems in cooperative games

In 2013, the International Game Theory Review published two special issues on open problems in cooperative games: the first regarding theory and the second applications. In this paper, our aim is to present some problems...

Spectral analysis of business cycles in Poland and its major trading partners

The properties of business cycles in Poland and its major trading partners have been examined. The business cycle synchronization (BCS) between Poland and other countries was studied in order to assess the impact of inte...

Determining models of influence

We consider a model of opinion formation based on aggregation functions. Each player modifies his opinion by arbitrarily aggregating the current opinion of all players. A player is influential on another player if the op...

Download PDF file
  • EP ID EP323617
  • DOI -
  • Views 28
  • Downloads 0

How To Cite

Francesc CARRERAS, Josep FREIXAS, Antonio MAGAÑA (2016). Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems. Operations Research and Decisions, 26(2), 31-52. https://europub.co.uk/articles/-A-323617