Exploiting moral wiggle room: Illusory preference for fairness? A comment
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2009, Vol 4, Issue 6
Abstract
We designed an experiment to test the robustness of Dana, Weber, and Kuang’s (DWK), 2007 results. DWK observed that, when participants were given a “costless” way — the click of a button — to ignore the consequences of their actions on others’ payoffs, they chose to remain ignorant and fair behavior diminished. By implementing a double-blind experiment together with a design that controls for alternative explanations for the observed behavior, we confirmed DWK’s findings.
Authors and Affiliations
Tara Larson and C. Monica Capra
Keywords
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