Less-is-more effects without the recognition heuristic
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2010, Vol 5, Issue 4
Abstract
Inferences consistent with “recognition-based” decision-making may be drawn for various reasons other than recognition alone. We demonstrate that, for 2-alternative forced-choice decision tasks, less-is-more effects (reduced performance with additional learning) are not restricted to recognition-based inference but can also be seen in circumstances where inference is knowledge-based but item knowledge is limited. One reason why such effects may not be observed more widely is the dependence of the effect on specific values for the validity of recognition and knowledge cues. We show that both recognition and knowledge validity may vary as a function of the number of items recognized. The implications of these findings for the special nature of recognition information, and for the investigation of recognition-based inference, are discussed.
Authors and Affiliations
C. Philip Beaman, Philip T. Smith, Caren A. Frosch and Rachel McCloy
Keywords
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