Ostracism and fines in a public goods game with accidental contributions: The importance of punishment type

Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2014, Vol 9, Issue 4

Abstract

Punishment is an important method for discouraging uncooperative behavior. We use a novel design for a public goods game in which players have explicit intended contributions with accidentally changed actual contributions, and in which players can apply costly fines or ostracism. Moreover, all players except the subject are automated, whereby we control the intended contributions, actual contributions, costly fines, and ostracisms experienced by the subject. We assess subject’s utilization of other players’ intended and actual contributions when making decisions to fine or ostracize. Hierarchical Bayesian logistic regression provides robust estimates. We find that subjects emphasize actual contribution more than intended contribution when deciding to fine, but emphasize intended contribution more than actual contribution when deciding to ostracize. We also find that the efficacy of past punishment, in terms of changing the contributions of the punished player, influences the type of punishment selected. Finally, we find that the punishment norms of the automated players affect the punishments performed by the subject. These novel paradigms and analyses indicate that punishment is flexible and adaptive, contrary to some evolutionary theories that predict inflexible punishments that emphasize outcomes.

Authors and Affiliations

Torrin M. Liddell and John K. Kruschke

Keywords

Related Articles

Pace yourself: Improving time-saving judgments when increasing activity speed

The time-saving bias describes people’s tendency to misestimate the time they can save by increasing the speed in which they perform an activity such as driving or completing a task. People typically underestimate time s...

Are good reasoners more incest-friendly? Trait cognitive reflection predicts selective moralization in a sample of American adults

Two studies examined the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection (CRT) and the tendency to accord genuinely moral (non-conventional) status to a range of counter-normative acts — that is, to t...

The opportunity-threat theory of decision-making under risk

A new theory of decision-making under risk, the Opportunity-Threat Theory is proposed. Analysis of risk into opportunity and threat components allows description of behavior as a combination of opportunity seeking and th...

An examination of ambiguity aversion: Are two heads better than one?

Ambiguity aversion has been widely observed in individuals' judgments. Using scenarios that are typical in decision analysis, we investigate ambiguity aversion for pairs of individuals. We examine risky and cautious shif...

A signal detection theory analysis of racial and ethnic disproportionality in the referral and substantiation processes of the U.S. child welfare services system

Signal detection theory (SDT) was developed to analyze the behavior of a single judge but also can be used to analyze decisions made by organizations or other social systems. SDT quantifies the ability to distinguish bet...

Download PDF file
  • EP ID EP678147
  • DOI -
  • Views 116
  • Downloads 0

How To Cite

Torrin M. Liddell and John K. Kruschke (2014). Ostracism and fines in a public goods game with accidental contributions: The importance of punishment type. Judgment and Decision Making, 9(4), -. https://europub.co.uk/articles/-A-678147