Probability biases as Bayesian inference
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2006, Vol 1, Issue 1
Abstract
In this article, I will show how several observed biases in human probabilistic reasoning can be partially explained as good heuristics for making inferences in an environment where probabilities have uncertainties associated to them. Previous results show that the weight functions and the observed violations of coalescing and stochastic dominance can be understood from a Bayesian point of view. We will review those results and see that Bayesian methods should also be used as part of the explanation behind other known biases. That means that, although the observed errors are still errors under the laboratory conditions in which they are demonstrated, they can %XX be understood as adaptations to the solution of real life problems. Heuristics that allow fast evaluations and mimic a Bayesian inference would be an evolutionary advantage, since they would give us an efficient way of making decisions.
Authors and Affiliations
André C. R. Martins
Keywords
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