Prompting deliberation increases base-rate use
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2016, Vol 11, Issue 1
Abstract
People often base judgments on stereotypes, even when contradictory base-rate information is provided. In a sample of 438 students from two state universities, we tested several hypotheses regarding why people would prefer stereotype information over base-rates when making judgments: A) People believe stereotype information is more diagnostic than base-rate information, B) people find stereotype information more salient than base-rate information, or C) even though people have some intuitive access to base-rate information, they may need to engage in deliberation before they can make full use of it, and often fail to do so. In line with the deliberative failure account, and counter to the diagnosticity account, we found that inducing deliberation by having people evaluate statements supporting the use of base-rates increased the use of base-rate information. Moreover, counter to the salience and diagnosticity accounts, asking people to evaluate statements supporting the use of stereotypes decreased reliance on stereotype information. Additionally, more numerate subjects were more likely to make use of base-rate information.
Authors and Affiliations
Natalie A. Obrecht and Dana L. Chesney
Keywords
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