THE QUESTION “WHY?” AS THE FOUNDATION FOR KNOWLEDGE OF CAUSES IN ARISTOTLE
Journal Title: Studia Gilsoniana - Year 2013, Vol 2, Issue
Abstract
According to Aristotle, philosophical knowledge consists in the discovery of the first causes that occur in reality. For this reason, the quantitative and essential analysis of the causes was the fundamental task for philosophical reflections. Aristotle considered it a priority to show the ways the causes are discerned in the aspect of questions that occur in the cognitive process. The question “why” is the question that Aristotle regarded as fundamental for the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. The phenomenon of this question is revealed when we indicate that it corresponds to the causes that occur in reality. The causes discerned in this way become the foundation for building the method of causal knowledge.
Authors and Affiliations
Paweł Gondek
Keywords
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