A Naturalistic Account of Free Will (II)
Journal Title: Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy - Year 2014, Vol 11, Issue 0
Abstract
Several arguments based on neuroscience have been proposed against the possibility of free will. I have pointed out that those arguments against free will depend first on arguments against the existence of the self. According to Rodolfo Llinás’s case against the self, for example, since no experience-centralizing area exists in the brain, and since our sense of self is thus an internal perception that could not correspond to any such brain area, the self does not exist. But I have shown against Llinás, as well as against Daniel Dennett and others, that their objections against the self are only applicable against a conscious self, the sort of notion that fits well with Cartesian philosophy. Nevertheless, in this age of neuroscience there is no reason to theorize on the basis of such a notion. Given that the mind is biological, so should the self. We must then reason on the basis of a biological notion of the self, i.e. on the basis of a notion compatible with neuroscience in the context of evolutionary biology. When we do so, we come to realize that the self, which performs many functions involving many areas of the brain, is a distributive mechanism — it need not be centralized at all. We also come to realize that the self is also mostly unconscious, and that our sense of self, being an internal perception, as Llinás himself pointed out, is subject to illusions. But we ought not to confuse the sense of self with the self any more than we ought to confuse the perception of an elephant with the elephant. Given the biological conception of the self I defend, a plausible case can be made that, given also my notion of strong emergence, that the self does indeed determine the person’s actions. This ought to be the proper approach to the problem of free will, as previously pointed out by Gary Watson.
Authors and Affiliations
Gonzalo Munévar
Keywords
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