Cognitive reflection test and behavioral biases in Malaysia
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2014, Vol 9, Issue 2
Abstract
We asked whether behavioral biases are related to cognitive abilities of Malaysian youth. Frederick’s three-item Cognitive Reflection Test was used to understand the role of behavioral biases concerning behavioral economics and finance. The sample (n = 880) comprised of university students from different parts of Malaysia. We found significant CRT differences as a function of gender, race and age groups. In addition, lower scores on the CRT are correlated positively with time preference and conservatism, but not with risk preference or the conjunction fallacy.
Authors and Affiliations
Mohamed Albaity, Mahfuz Rahman and Islam Shahidul
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