Learning affects top down and bottom up modulation of eye movements in decision making
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2013, Vol 8, Issue 6
Abstract
Repeated decision making is subject to changes over time such as decreases in decision time and information use and increases in decision accuracy. We show that a traditional strategy selection view of decision making cannot account for these temporal dynamics without relaxing main assumptions about what defines a decision strategy. As an alternative view we suggest that temporal dynamics in decision making are driven by attentional and perceptual processes and that this view has been expressed in the information reduction hypothesis. We test the information reduction hypothesis by integrating it in a broader framework of top down and bottom up processes and derive the predictions that repeated decisions increase top down control of attention capture which in turn leads to a reduction in bottom up attention capture. To test our hypotheses we conducted a repeated discrete choice experiment with three different information presentation formats. We thereby operationalized top down and bottom up control as the effect of individual utility levels and presentation formats on attention capture on a trial-by-trial basis. The experiment revealed an increase in top down control of eye movements over time and that decision makers learn to attend to high utility stimuli and ignore low utility stimuli. We furthermore find that the influence of presentation format on attention capture reduces over time indicating diminishing bottom up control.
Authors and Affiliations
Jacob L. Orquin, Martin P. Bagger and Simone Mueller Loose
Keywords
Related Articles
- EP ID EP678103
- DOI -
- Views 135
- Downloads 0
On the descriptive value of loss aversion in decisions under risk: Six clarifications
Previous studies of loss aversion in decisions under risk have led to mixed results. Losses appear to loom larger than gains in some settings, but not in others. The current paper clarifies these results by highlighting...
Information asymmetry in decision from description versus decision from experience
In this paper we investigate the claim that decisions from experience (in which the features of lotteries are learned through a sampling process) differ from decisions from description (in which features of lotteries are...
Pair-wise comparisons of multiple models
Often research in judgment and decision making requires comparison of multiple competing models. Researchers invoke global measures such as the rate of correct predictions or the sum of squared (or absolute) deviations o...
A response to Mandel’s (2019) commentary on Stastny and Lehner (2018)
Stastny and Lehner (2018) compared the accuracy of forecasts in an intelligence community prediction market to comparable forecasts in analysis reports prepared by groups of professional intelligence analysts. To obtain...
The decision paradoxes motivating Prospect Theory: The prevalence of the paradoxes increases with numerical ability
Prospect Theory (PT: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of risky decision making is based on psychological phenomena (paradoxes) that motivate assumptions about how people react to gains and losses, and how they weight outcomes w...