Numeracy, frequency, and Bayesian reasoning
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2009, Vol 4, Issue 1
Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that Bayesian reasoning performance is improved if uncertainty information is presented as natural frequencies rather than single-event probabilities. A questionnaire study of 342 college students replicated this effect but also found that the performance-boosting benefits of the natural frequency presentation occurred primarily for participants who scored high in numeracy. This finding suggests that even comprehension and manipulation of natural frequencies requires a certain threshold of numeracy abilities, and that the beneficial effects of natural frequency presentation may not be as general as previously believed.
Authors and Affiliations
Gretchen B. Chapman and Jingjing Liu
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