The agency problem between management boards members and the Treasury in Polish State Owned Companies

Journal Title: Zarządzanie i Finanse - Year 2015, Vol 13, Issue 1

Abstract

The article concerns the agency problem between management boards members and the Treasury in Polish State Owned Companies. The agency prob- lem in this kind of companies has its own specificities that result from the fact that the Treasury is their sole or major shareholder. The purpose of the article is to identify these specificities. The research is multidisciplinary, comprising an anal- ysis of legal regulations and a survey carried out among members of manage- ment and supervisory boards of state-owned companies and among officials of the Ministry of Treasury supervising these companies. The regulation analysis’s purpose, which results are presented in Chapter 1, was to indicate, how the regu- lation affects the agency problem between management boards members and the Treasury. The survey results, analyzed in Chapter 2, were to identify the prob- lems of functioning of management boards and indicate the determinants of ma- nagement boards members’ actions. Both regulation analysis and the survey re- garded the problem of management boards members remuneration that also determines the agency problem.

Authors and Affiliations

Igor Postuła

Keywords

Related Articles

 Modelowanie procesów decyzyjnych na rynku funduszy inwestycyjnych z wykorzystaniem przełącznikowego modelu Treynora-Mazuy’ego

 W artykule przedstawiono ewolucję polskiego rynku funduszy inwestycyjnych oraz opisano wybrane modele wyczucia rynku: Treynora-Mazuy’ego, Henrikssona-Mertona, trójczynnikowy model Famy-Frencha. Zaprezentowano ró...

 Minimum required rate of return and profitability of assets gathered in Polish and Swiss pension funds

 The first part of the article presents the rules regarding the functioning of the Swiss pension system, showing the role of pension funds in the scheme and the significance of mechanisms protecting their members. T...

Struktura własności i prawa akcjonariuszy jako mechanizm nadzoru korporacyjnego na przykładzie spółek rosyjskich  

 Celem artykułu jest omówienie podstawowych aspektów dotyczących struktury własności przedsiębiorstw w Rosji oraz roli tego mechanizmu w systemie nadzoru korporacyjnego. W pierwszej części autorka opisuje znaczen...

The consolidation, cooperation and competition - according to the method of building competitive advantage and survival of the company 

This article contains content of ways to improve the competitiveness of the markets for the beginning of the 21 century. Presents topics in theory and includes practical examples, researched by the author. Maintaining a...

 Dairy farms in Europe - the organization and efficiency

 The main purpose of the article was to analyse the cost competitiveness of the typical dairy farms distinguished within IFCN (International Farm Comparison Network) and to present the price of the ground and the wo...

Download PDF file
  • EP ID EP137930
  • DOI -
  • Views 40
  • Downloads 0

How To Cite

Igor Postuła (2015). The agency problem between management boards members and the Treasury in Polish State Owned Companies. Zarządzanie i Finanse, 13(1), 199-219. https://europub.co.uk/articles/-A-137930