The effects of total sleep deprivation on bayesian updating
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2008, Vol 3, Issue 2
Abstract
Subjects performed a decision task (Grether, 1980) in both a well-rested and experimentally sleep-deprived state. We found two main results: 1) final choice accuracy was unaffected by sleep deprivation, and yet 2) the estimated decision model differed significantly following sleep-deprivation. Following sleep deprivation, subjects placed significantly less weight on new information in forming their beliefs. Because the altered decision process still maintains decision accuracy, it may suggest that increased accident and error rates attributed to reduced sleep in modern society stem from reduced auxiliary function performance (e.g., slowed reaction time, reduced motor skills) or other components of decision making, rather than the inability to integrate multiple pieces of information.
Authors and Affiliations
David L. Dickinson and Sean P. A. Drummond
Keywords
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