Gender Differences in Risk Assessment: Why do Women Take Fewer Risks than Men?
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2006, Vol 1, Issue 1
Abstract
Across many real-world domains, men engage in more risky behaviors than do women. To examine some of the beliefs and preferences that underlie this difference, 657 participants assessed their likelihood of engaging in various risky activities relating to four different domains (gambling, health, recreation, and social), and reported their perceptions of (1) probability of negative outcomes, (2) severity of potential negative outcomes, and (3) enjoyment expected from the risky activities. Women's greater perceived likelihood of negative outcomes and lesser expectation of enjoyment partially mediated their lower propensity toward risky choices in gambling, recreation, and health domains. Perceptions of severity of potential outcomes was a partial mediator in the gambling and health domains. The genders did not differ in their propensity towards taking social risks. A fifth domain of activities associated with high potential payoffs and fixed minor costs was also assessed. In contrast to other domains, women reported being more likely to engage in behaviors in this domain. This gender difference was partially mediated by women's more optimistic judgments of the probability of good outcomes and of outcomes being more intensely positive.
Authors and Affiliations
Christine R. Harris, Michael Jenkins, and Dale Glaser
Keywords
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